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Abstract 
We consider endogenous choice of the strategic variables, price and quantity, in a 
horizontally differentiated duopoly market, assuming network effects and product 
compatibility (hereafter, network compatibility effects). We demonstrate the following. 
If the degree of network compatibility effects of the other rival firm is smaller (larger) 
than the degree of product substitutability, then choosing quantity (price) is a dominant 
strategy for the firm. In this case, the Cournot (Bertrand) equilibrium arises. If there are 
asymmetric network compatibility effects between the firms, the firm with larger 
(smaller) network compatibility effects than the degree of product substitutability 
chooses quantity (price). In this case, the Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium arises. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of endogenous strategy choice, i.e., price and quantity, in market 
competition is an important problem in the field of industrial organization. Based on a 
differentiated duopoly model, Singh and Vives (1984) consider endogenous strategy 
choice in a two-stage game, in which the firms each choose either a quantity contract or 
a price contract in the first stage and then they compete on the chosen strategy in the 
second stage. They demonstrate that choosing a quantity (price) contract is a dominant 
strategy if the products are substitutes (complements). Thus, the Cournot (Bertrand) 
equilibrium arises. See also Cheng (1985). 
   Since the seminal article of Singh and Vives (1984), several studies have appeared 
that related to ours. For example, Tanaka (2001a) demonstrates that choosing a quantity 
strategy is dominant for both firms in the case of a vertically differentiated products 
market. Furthermore, based on a differentiated oligopoly model, Tanaka (2001b) shows 
that a quantity strategy is the best response for each firm when all other firms choose a 
price strategy. Using the model of Zanchettin (2006), in which asymmetric costs are 
assumed, Wang (2008) considers a two-stage game with endogenous strategy choice. He 
shows that the two-stage game has a weakly-dominant strategy equilibrium in which 
both firms choose a quantity contract in the first stage, and if both firms produce a 
positive output level, then the Bertrand equilibrium does not hold.  
   Recently, Chirco and Scrimitore (2013) consider strategy choice, focusing on the 
role of delegation under network effects. They show that both firms choose a quantity 
contract in the case of no-delegation, whereas a price contract is the unique equilibrium 
in the case of delegation if certain conditions regarding the parameters of the network 
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effect and product differentiation are satisfied. Furthermore, using the demand function 
of Chirco and Scrimitore (2013), but not assuming delegation, Pal (2014), which is 
closely related to our paper, demonstrates that choosing a quantity contract is the 
dominant strategy regardless of the strength of network effects, and that the profit in the 
Bertrand equilibrium is larger than that in the Cournot equilibrium unless network 
effects are weak.  
We reconsider endogenous choice of the strategic variables, price and quantity, 
introducing product compatibility into the network effects models of Katz and Shapiro 
(1985) and Economides (1996). In this paper, denoting the combination of network 
effects and product compatibility as network compatibility effects, we consider the role 
of asymmetric network compatibility effects between firms.  
We demonstrate the following: 
(i) Singh and Vives case. If the degree of network compatibility effects of both firms 
is smaller (larger) than the degree of product substitutability, choosing quantity is a 
dominate strategy for both firms. In this case, the Cournot (Bertrand) equilibrium arises.  
(ii) Asymmetric network compatibility effects case. When there is asymmetry 
between the network compatibility effects of the products produced by firms, the firm 
producing the product with degree of network compatibility effects that are larger 
(smaller) than the degree of product substitutability chooses quantity (price). In this case, 
the Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium arises.  
With respect to the Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium, e.g., Tremblay and Tremblay 
(2011) and Tremblay et al (2011) present the example that Scion (and Saturn) dealers 
behave as a Bertrand-type firm whereas Honda (and Subaru) dealers behave as a 
Cournot-type firm. 
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2. The Model 
 
2.1 The Cournot equilibrium  
We consider Cournot quantity competition in horizontally differentiated products 
with network compatibility effects. Using the framework of Economides (1996), the 
linear inverse demand function of product i is given as: 
),( eijii SfqqAp +−−= q  ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                   (1) 
where A  is the intrinsic market size, iq  )( jq  is the quantity of firm i (j), and 
( )1,0∈q  is the degree of product substitutability. The network externality function is 
given by ),( eiSf  where 
e
iS  is the expected network size of firm i. Based on the 
concept of fulfilled expectations, we assume that ,i
e
i SS =  where iS  is the real 
network size of firm i. Using equation (3.15) in Shy (2001, p. 62), the real network size 
of firm i is given by: 
,jiii qqS α+= ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                              (2) 
where [ ],1,0∈iα  ,2,1=i  denotes the degree of product i’s compatibility with product j. 
Equation (2) implies that firm i will provide a compatible product with which the rival 
firm’s product j can operate. If 1=iα ),0( ,2,1=i  a user of product i operates (does not 
operate) perfectly with product j. iq ),( jiqα ,,2,1, jiji ≠= represents the own 
(incoming) effect on the network size. Furthermore, we assume a linear network effect 
function; ,)( ii aSSf =  where ( )1,0∈a  is the network effect parameter of network 
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size. 
Based on equations (1) and (2), the inverse demand function of firm i can be 
expressed as: 
,)()1( jiii qaqaAp αq −−−−= .,2,1, jiji ≠=                (3) 
For equation (3), we assume that the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price effect, 
i.e., ,
j
i
i
i
dq
dp
dq
dp
> .,2,1, jiji ≠=  Thus, it follows that ,01 >−>− iaa αq .2,1=i   
Furthermore, regarding the network effect parameter, we assume the following: 
 
Assumption 1: .q>a  
 
That is, the network effects are stronger than the product substitutability effects. 
Otherwise, as ,a>q  a strategic substitutes relationship arises, because ,1 iα≥ .2,1=i  
In the case of price competition, a strategic complements relationship arises. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that production costs and fixed costs are both 
zero. In other words, this assumption implies that there are no capacity constraints. Thus, 
the profit of firm i is expressed as ,iii qp=p .2,1=i   
As shown below, although the products are horizontally differentiated, ,01 >> q  
the products are complements (substitutes) if the degree of product compatibility with 
network effects is larger (smaller) than the degree of product substitutability, 
,)( qα <>ia .2,1=i  This nature of the products determines the strategic relationships 
between the firms and the external effects on their profits, and thus, in turn, affects the 
choice of strategic variables. Hereafter, we denote the combination of product 
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compatibility and network effects, ,iaα ,2,1=i  as network compatibility effects. 
Considering equation (3), we derive the reaction function for firm i as follows: 
,
)1(2)1(2 j
i
i qa
a
a
Aq
−
−
−
−
=
αq  .,2,1, jiji ≠=                   (4) 
Given equation (4), the strategic relationship between the firms depends on the 
degree of product substitutability and the degree of network compatibility effects: 
,)(0)( i
j
i a
q
q
αq <>⇔><
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=                     (5) 
Equation (5) implies that a strategic complements (substitutes) relationship between 
the firms holds if the degree of network compatibility effects is larger (smaller) than that 
of product substitutability.  
Using the first-order profit-maximization condition, the profit function is 
( ) ,)1( 2ii qa−=p .2,1=i  Thus, in view of equation (5), we derive the external effect of 
an increase in the output of firm j on the profit of firm i as follows: 
,)(0)()1(2 i
j
i
i
j
i a
q
qqa
q
αq
p
<>⇔><
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=         (6) 
   For the following analysis, regarding the degree of product compatibility, we 
assume the following: 
 
Assumption 2: .01 21 ≥>≥ αα  
 
Given equation (4), we derive the following Cournot equilibrium: 
{ },)()1(2
D
aaAq iCi
αq −−−
=                             (7) 
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where 0))(()1(4 21
2 >−−−−≡ αqαq aaaD  and ,0)()1(2 >−−− iaa αq .2,1=i  
Both of these conditions are satisfied because the own-price effect exceeds the 
cross-price effect. Superscript C denotes the Cournot equilibrium. 
 
2.2 The Bertrand equilibrium  
Taking equation (3) into account, we derive the direct demand function of firm i as 
follows: 
,
)()1()}()1{(
∆
−+−−−−−
= jiiii
papaAaa
q
αqαq
,,2,1, jiji ≠=     (8) 
where .0))(()1( 21
2 >−−−−≡∆ αqαq aaa Based on equation (8), the reaction 
function for firm i is given by: 
,
)1(2)1(2
)}()1{(
j
ii
i pa
a
a
Aaap
−
−
+
−
−−−
=
αqαq  .,2,1, jiji ≠=       (9) 
Thus, the strategic relationship between the firms depends on the degree of product 
substitutability and the degree of network compatibility effects: 
,)(0)( i
j
i a
p
p
αq <>⇔<>
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=                    (10) 
Equation (10) implies that a strategic complements (substitutes) relationship 
between the firms exists if the degree of product substitutability is higher (lower) than 
that of network compatibility. Furthermore, we derive the external effect of an increase 
in the output of firm j on the profit of firm i as follows: 
,)(0)( i
j
i a
p
αq
p
<>⇔<>
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=                    (11) 
Given equation (10), we derive the following Bertrand equilibrium: 
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{ },))(())(1()1(2 21
2
D
aaaaaAp iBi
αqαqαq −−−−−−−
=      (12) 
where 0))(())(1()1(2 21
2 >−−−−−−− αqαqαq aaaaa i .2,1=i  This condition is 
satisfied because the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price effect. Superscript B 
denotes the Bertrand equilibrium. 
 
2.3 Quantity−price mixed duopoly and the Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium 
Before considering the endogenous choice of strategic variables, we derive the 
Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium. Without losing of generality, we assume that firm i (j) 
chooses quantity (price) as the strategic variable in the market competition. Taking 
equations (3) and (8) into account, we derive the following: 
,
1
)()}()1{(
a
paqAaa
p jiiii −
−+∆−−−−
=
αqαq
             (13) 
,
1
)(
a
qapA
q ijjj −
−−−
=
αq
                             (14) 
where .,2,1, jiji ≠=  Based on equations (13) and (14), from the first-order profit 
maximization conditions of each firm, we derive the following reaction functions: 
,
2
)()}()1{(
∆
−+−−−
= jiii
paAaa
q
αqαq
                  (15) 
,
2
)( ij
j
qaA
p
αq −−
=                                  (16) 
where .,2,1, jiji ≠=  Thus, regarding the strategic relationships, it follows that 
i
j
i a
p
q αq )(0)( <>⇔<>
∂
∂
 and ,)(0)( j
i
j a
q
p
αq <>⇔><
∂
∂
 .,2,1, jiji ≠=  Furthermore, 
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regarding the external effect on the profit, it follows that i
j
i a
p
αq
p )(0)( <>⇔<>
∂
∂
 and 
,)(0)( j
i
j a
q
αq
p
<>⇔><
∂
∂
 .,2,1, jiji ≠=  
   Considering equations (15) and (16), we obtain the following Cournot−Bertrand 
equilibrium: 
{ } ,
))((2
)()1(2
21 αqαq
αq
aaD
aaAq iMi −−−
−−−
=                          (17) 
{ }
,
))((2
))(())(1()1(2
21
21
2
αqαq
αqαqαq
aaD
aaaaaA
p jMj −−−
−−−−−−−
=     (18) 
where ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  and superscript M denotes the Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium. 
 
 
3. Endogenous choice of strategic variables and network compatibility effects 
 
Based on the analysis in Section 2, we express the profit in the Cournot equilibrium as: 
[ ] ( ) ,)1(, 2CijiCi qaQQ −=p .2,1=i                         (19) 
In equation (19), iQ  )( jQ  is the strategic variable, i.e., quantity, of firm i (j). Similarly, 
the profit in the Bertrand equilibrium is expressed as: 
[ ] ( ) ,1, 2BijiBi paPP ∆
−
=p ,2,1=i                           (20) 
where iP  )( jP  is the strategic variable, i.e., price, of firm i (j). Furthermore, regarding 
the profits in the Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium, where firm i (j) chooses quantity 
(price), their profits are expressed as: 
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[ ] ( ) ,
1
,
2M
iji
M
i qa
PQ
−
∆
=p                                (21) 
[ ] ( ) ,
1
1,
2M
jji
M
j pa
PQ
−
=p                               (22) 
where .,2,1, jiji ≠=   
   With respect to the endogenous choice of strategic variables, without loss of the 
generality, we compare the profits of firm 1 as follows:  
[ ] [ ],,)(, 211211 QPQQ MC pp <>                              (23) 
[ ] [ ].,)(, 211211 PPPQ BM pp <>                              (24) 
   First, regarding equation (23), taking equations (7), (18), (19), and (22), we derive 
the following relationship. 
[ ] [ ] .)(,)(, 2211211 αqpp aQPQQ MC <>⇔<>                  (25) 
Second, regarding equation (24), taking equations (12), (17), (20), and (21), we 
derive the following relationship. 
[ ] [ ] .)(,)(, 2211211 αqpp aPPPQ BM <>⇔<>                   (26) 
The same results apply to firm 2. That is, we have the following relationships. 
[ ] [ ] ,)(,)(, 1212212 αqpp aPQQQ MC <>⇔<>                 (27) 
[ ] [ ] .)(,)(, 1212212 αqpp aPPQP BM <>⇔<>                  (28) 
Taking equations (25), (26), (27), and (28), into account, we derive Lemma 1 as 
follows: 
 
Lemma 1 
If the degree of network compatibility effects of the rival firm’s product is larger 
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(smaller) than that of product substitutability, the firm chooses price (quantity). 
 
   It is important that the optimal choice of the strategies for the firm depends on the 
nature of the rival firm’s product. That is, if the degree of network compatibility effects 
of the rival firm’s product is larger than that of product substitutability, the strategic 
relationship of the rival firm with respect to the firm is one of complement goods. In 
other words, the rival firm’s product is compatible with the firm’s product. Thus, 
following Singh and Vives (1984), in this case, the firm commits to a price contract, but 
not a quantity contract. This is because the firm can adjust their quantity in response to a 
change in the quantity or price of the rival firm, given the contracted price. Suppose that 
the firm commits to a quantity contract. If the rival firm cuts its price or increases its 
quantity, the firm cannot increase its quantity. Thus, the quantity contact is not optimal 
for the firm. Contrarily, if the degree of network compatibility effects of the rival firm’s 
product is smaller than that of product substitutability, the strategic relationship of the 
rival firm with respect to the firm is one involving substitute goods. In other words, the 
rival firm’s product is less compatible or incompatible with the firm’s product. Thus, the 
firm commits to a quantity contract, but not a price contract. Suppose that the firm 
commits to a price contract. If the rival firm cuts its price, the firm cannot change the 
price contract. On the other hand, if the firm commits to a quantity contract, the firm 
can cut their price in response to the rival firm’s price cut, given the contracted quantity. 
Therefore, based on Assumptions 1 and 2, and Lemma 1, we present the main result 
as follows. 
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Proposition 1 
(i) If it holds that ,21 ααq aa >>  choosing quantity is a dominant strategy for both 
firms. In this case, the Cournot equilibrium arises. 
(ii) If it holds that ,21 qαα >> aa  choosing price is a dominant strategy for both firms. 
In this case, the Bertrand equilibrium arises. 
(iii) If it holds that ,21 αqα aa >>  choosing quantity is a dominant strategy for firm 1 
and choosing price is a dominant strategy for firm 2. In this case, the 
Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium arises. 
 
   In the case of Proposition 1 (i), the products of the two firms are substitute because 
the network compatibility effects of both products are weak. Thus, this corresponds to 
the case of substitute goods in Proposition 2 of Singh and Vives (1984). On the other 
hand, in the case of Proposition 1 (ii), the products of both firms are complements 
because the network compatibility effects of both products are strong, although the 
products themselves are substitutes in the sense of horizontal product differentiation. 
Thus, this corresponds to the case of complement goods in Proposition 2 of Singh and 
Vives (1984). 
   If we assume either the case of symmetric product compatibility (i.e., ααα == 21 ) 
or the case of weak network effects (i.e., a≥q ), we have the same results as those of 
Singh and Vives (1984). However, we demonstrate that if there is asymmetric product 
compatibility with large network effects, i.e., given significantly asymmetric network 
compatibility effects between the products of the firms, the Cournot-Bertrand 
equilibrium arises. In other words, although the horizontally differentiated products in 
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our model are substitutes, if the network compatibility effects are sufficiently strong, the 
strategic relationship between the firms is one involving complement goods. 
Furthermore, if there is a substantial asymmetry between the network compatibility 
effects of the two products, the Cournot-Bertrand equilibrium arises. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
We introduce network effects and product compatibility, i.e., network compatibility 
effects, into the model of Singh and Vives (1984), which assumes linear demand and 
cost functions, no fixed costs, and no capacity constraints. In particular, we demonstrate 
that if there are asymmetric network compatibility effects between the products, the 
Cournot-Bertrand equilibrium arises. In this case, choosing quantity (price) is a 
dominant strategy for the firm producing the product with larger (smaller) network 
compatibility effects. 
We appreciate the shortcomings imposed by the specific assumptions of the model, 
e.g., linearity of the demand, cost, and network functions. Thus, the issues discussed in 
this paper should also be examined using more general functions. Furthermore, we 
analyze the issues in the case of oligopoly. We also assume that the network 
compatibility effects are exogenous. However, we should consider why asymmetric 
network compatibility effects between firms arise because product compatibility is an 
important strategic variable. 
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